>One very common error people make is to believe that ethics - at least epistemically and for the most part - is sectarian. This view seems to stem from an ultimately nihilistic presupposition that morality is a fiction supplied by the fiction of religion. But that is not the natural law view and thus a view alien to both Aristotle and to Christianity.
I didn’t make that claim in any implied way, I asserted, correctly, that Aristotle is not an Abrahamic thinker.
> The natural law view is that human beings have a nature, which is most centrally to be a rational animal with the freedom to choose between alternatives apprehended by the intellect. Thus, Man has moral responsibility, because he plays a part in choosing what he does. Accordingly, because human nature defines what is good or bad for human beings (that which actualizes human potential in accord with reason vs. that which frustrates or opposes reason and the actualization of potential in accord with it), we bear responsibility for how we exercise our powers. Aristotle wasn't completely, but the core principles in the Metaphysics or his ethical works or in epistemology are - in my view - spot on.
The Nichomachean Ethics doesn’t discuss ethics within any context of absolute free will even, it is a very qualified doing. Aristotle explicitly points out that the actions of slaves are entirely disqualified from being considered ethical. Most Christian theologies would vehemently disagree precisely because having the supra-knowledge of the Mystery imparted upon one necessarily brings one's being into the dimension of revealed universality. That's not what Aristotle is talking about.
> What Christianity does or claims to do is supplement what is knowable by unaided reason with revealed knowledge - the object of faith - which, of course, does have ethical import, but it does not negate or supplant what is knowable by unaided reason.
All three of the Abrahamic theologies were infected by Neoplatonism, which . The Europeans revived their Neoplatonism through the Muslims even. The Middle Ages Christian theology of the "chain of being" is a riff on Neoplatonist "ladder of being".
Aristotle was describing in Metaphysics a cosmology concerned with unpacking the notion of motion as the actualization of potentiality, hence, "First Mover", which is not at all an Abrahamic idea.
> FWIW, Aquinas drew heavily from Aristotle and had such enormous respect for Aristotle, he referred to him as simply "the Philosopher".
This doesn’t interact with my point since it requires us first to ask how he read Aristotle, whom was not an Abrahamic thinker. An aside, but the Muslims called Aristotle “The Philosopher” (Ibn Rashud, Ibn Sina), and that tradition was received through the Muslims by their European readers.
> I didn’t make that claim in any implied way, I asserted, correctly, that Aristotle is not an Abrahamic thinker.
I was trying to make sense of what your two disconnected sentences were saying and used this as an opportunity to address what I suspected may be the underlying presuppositions.
> The Nichomachean Ethics doesn’t discuss ethics within any context of absolute free will even
Aristotle does, in fact, discuss "choice" (προαίρεσις) and the "voluntary" (τὸ ἑκούσιον) to lay the ground for moral responsibility. I grant you it is not identical to the view of, say, Aquinas who goes further than Aristotle - indeed, he takes Augustine's account of the will and integrates it with the Aristotelian - but it isn't a wholesale departure from the Aristotelian either. Aquinas calls the will "rational appetite" (voluntas ut ratio) which is a very Aristotelian take. A notable and immediately relevant Neoplatonic refinement he makes here - consistent with Aristotle - is the supplementation with voluntas ut natura.
Furthermore, I didn't write "absolute free will", by which I can only assume you mean "sheer will"? Rather, I intentionally wrote "freedom to choose between alternatives apprehended by the intellect". Absolute free will is more of a modern, secular notion, not a classical or Christian one (we do see its origins in the "sheer will" of Ockham), hence why we obsessively speak of "sovereignty" and "autonomy" today.
> Most Christian theologies would vehemently disagree precisely because having the supra-knowledge of the Mystery imparted upon one necessarily brings one's being into the dimension of revealed universality.
Whatever the Abrahamic influence on the course of Aristotelian thought, there is no reason to believe that Abrahamic influence was absolutely necessary to "universalize ethics" (take the early Stoics, for instance). This is expected and returns to my original point, that much of ethics is knowable in principle through unaided reason alone.
People have casually dismissed Aristotle in total merely because his physics is obsolete, even though it is separable from and in no way necessarily implied by his metaphysics. Similarly, his views about slaves and so on do not follow from these core principles and are rather auxiliary rationalizations of prevailing cultural practices. It was very much a failure on Aristotle's part to be consistent with his own natural law views.
> All three of the Abrahamic theologies were infected by Neoplatonism
"Infected" here is a needlessly tendentious and loaded term. I don't consider this influence as somehow undermining the essential core of Aristotelian thought. I do not think Aristotle was condemned to hold the aforementioned views on slaves, etc.
> Aristotle was describing in Metaphysics a cosmology concerned with unpacking the notion of motion as the actualization of potentiality, hence, "First Mover", which is not at all an Abrahamic idea.
Under a strict understanding faithful to Aristotle's complete views, yes, the Prime Mover is not "Abrahamic". But that doesn't mean the essential characteristics of the Prime Mover are in contradiction with, say, a traditionally Christian account, even if they are incomplete. At the very least, the Prime Mover establishes that there is a first actualizer along with some properties this actualizer must have.
> An aside, but the Muslims called Aristotle “The Philosopher” (Ibn Rashud, Ibn Sina), and that tradition was received through the Muslims by their European readers.
>Whatever the Abrahamic influence on the course of Aristotelian thought, there is no reason to believe that Abrahamic influence was absolutely necessary to "universalize ethics" (take the early Stoics, for instance). This is expected and returns to my original point, that much of ethics is knowable in principle through unaided reason alone.
Aristotle directly refutes this in Nichomachean Ethics, this is why I wrote that it is “a very qualified doing”. He asserts that you can’t simply “get good” at committing virtuous acts because they require the correct upbringing firstly (“it makes a very great difference; or rather all the difference”); a good amount of that text reads like a parenting book; you can’t turn the skip later in life. So when you say:
> freedom to choose between alternatives apprehended by the intellect
I don’t think this is exhaustive in describing what’s going on in Nichomachean Ethics to any degree to render all else negligible. Given the way he talks about “soul” (a word which also conveys the worst interpretation of what he’s talking about in De Anima), it becomes clearer to me why conditioning is so important to him.
I didn’t make that claim in any implied way, I asserted, correctly, that Aristotle is not an Abrahamic thinker.
> The natural law view is that human beings have a nature, which is most centrally to be a rational animal with the freedom to choose between alternatives apprehended by the intellect. Thus, Man has moral responsibility, because he plays a part in choosing what he does. Accordingly, because human nature defines what is good or bad for human beings (that which actualizes human potential in accord with reason vs. that which frustrates or opposes reason and the actualization of potential in accord with it), we bear responsibility for how we exercise our powers. Aristotle wasn't completely, but the core principles in the Metaphysics or his ethical works or in epistemology are - in my view - spot on.
The Nichomachean Ethics doesn’t discuss ethics within any context of absolute free will even, it is a very qualified doing. Aristotle explicitly points out that the actions of slaves are entirely disqualified from being considered ethical. Most Christian theologies would vehemently disagree precisely because having the supra-knowledge of the Mystery imparted upon one necessarily brings one's being into the dimension of revealed universality. That's not what Aristotle is talking about.
> What Christianity does or claims to do is supplement what is knowable by unaided reason with revealed knowledge - the object of faith - which, of course, does have ethical import, but it does not negate or supplant what is knowable by unaided reason.
All three of the Abrahamic theologies were infected by Neoplatonism, which . The Europeans revived their Neoplatonism through the Muslims even. The Middle Ages Christian theology of the "chain of being" is a riff on Neoplatonist "ladder of being".
Aristotle was describing in Metaphysics a cosmology concerned with unpacking the notion of motion as the actualization of potentiality, hence, "First Mover", which is not at all an Abrahamic idea.
> FWIW, Aquinas drew heavily from Aristotle and had such enormous respect for Aristotle, he referred to him as simply "the Philosopher".
This doesn’t interact with my point since it requires us first to ask how he read Aristotle, whom was not an Abrahamic thinker. An aside, but the Muslims called Aristotle “The Philosopher” (Ibn Rashud, Ibn Sina), and that tradition was received through the Muslims by their European readers.