In 1993, at the end of the Cold War, Secretary of Defense William Perry [0] summoned contractors to a dinner meeting, now called 'The Last Supper'. Unlike the original Last Supper, this one was the last (or the beginning of the end) for most of the guests: Perry told them that, having no more peer enemies, the US didn't need most of them. They would have to consolidate dramatically. At the end of the 1990s, 107 defense contractors had consolidated to five.
That was efficient and a good choice for the situation. Against a peer foe like the Soviet Union, you need lots of extra capacity to supply needs during a war when everything is consumed quickly, from ships to bullets. From the end of the Cold War until recently, that was unnecessary. The Taliban, Iraq, Serbia, Libya, etc. were not going to require so many munitions that there would be a crisis; they weren't going to sink any destroyers or shoot down any planes.
China is a 'near-peer' threat. As Russia's invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated, the capability of all of NATO - with combined economies maybe 30x Russia's - to manufacture supplies for Ukraine is insufficient. A war with China could be much larger; the US needs far more capacity.
Another, more critical reason is that some weaknesses are escalatory - they encourage escalation by the enemy. Chinese leaders, seeing the US lacks that capacity, are incentivised to escalate peace to conflict, conflict to war, a small war to a large war. Escalation is the bane of international relations - it is systemic and often cannot be controlled, leading to catastrophes that nobody wants but nobody can stop. Any professional foreign policy carefully constructs situations that are systemically de-escalatory.
(As an example, the US Space Force is changing from using a few expensive super-satellites to using very many cheap ones, in large part because having a few super-satellites is escalatory - it incentivizes an enemy to conduct a surprise attack, because they can knock out a large amount of capability at once.)
[0] OT: also a mathematics Ph.D. Do such people still rise to leadership in government? Or are they all maximizing click-thru for SV companies?
> Another, more critical reason is that some weaknesses are escalatory - they encourage escalation by the enemy. Chinese leaders, seeing the US lacks that capacity, are incentivised to escalate peace to conflict, conflict to war, a small war to a large war. Escalation is the bane of international relations - it is systemic and often cannot be controlled, leading to catastrophes that nobody wants but nobody can stop. Any professional foreign policy carefully constructs situations that are systemically de-escalatory.
Very interesting, can you recommend any source where I could learn more about such international relations mechanics and intricacies?
A good starting point would be Hans Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations. He was a German Jewish emigre to the United States, and it was with the help of the Rockefeller Foundation that his book was used to create International Relations departments within universities across the United States in the immediate post-WWII period. Prior to Morgenthau and the Rockefellers, international relations was not its own discipline distinct from history, philosophy, law, jurism, etc. Morgenthau's book was the standard textbook for international relations for several decades, and in it he tries to outline European realpolitik for his liberal American audience. His is still probably the most literate, sophisticated, and nuanced international relations introduction.
On the topic of a systemic drive to increase ones power at the expense of others, leading to escalatory and conflictual international dynamics, your go-to book is John Mearsheimer's The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. He is also in the realist school of thought like Morgenthau, although you'll find that his style of writing is much punchier and pugilistic than Morgenthau's.
On the attempt to build systemically de-escalatory effects at the international level, I would pick up a copy of G John Ikenberry's After Victory. He describes how victorious countries following major wars would create a new set of rules for the international system, and how at least some of those post-war regimes attempted to reduce the returns to power in order to increase the stability of the system and reduce perceptions of threat and insecurity by weaker states. Note that he worked in the State Department during Bush Sr administration and has that direct experience of attempting to ensure order and stability following the end of the Cold War.
If you want to read case studies in escalation toward a war that no single actor actually wanted, I recommend Stephen Van Evera's Causes of War with a focus on his study of WWI. It goes well paired with Barbara Tuchman's The Guns of August.
It's been a long time ... these days I just read about current applications of it ...
WWI is a classic study of it: Very broadly, many participants didn't want the war but the escalatory system of alliances, military capabilities, risks, etc. took it out of their hands. My vague memory is Barbara Tuchman's The Guns Of August focuses on it. But you can do better than my poor memory with some online research (see below).
You can also see it applied and discussed over and over in current international relations, though unfortunately without the context of the broader mechanisms and techniques: You can see the US finding ways to respond to Iran and Russia that are effective deterrents but non-escalatory, which they openly talk about. A strike on Tehran or the Iranian navy would be escalatory - they would have to strike back or lose credibility, domestically and internationally, and there would be the strong emotional component of dead Iranians. Hitting a supply depot in Syria is a different matter - costly to Iran, but not escalatory. The Iranians aren't idiots either - they are not assasinating American generals, for example.
If you want to read more:
* Look at professional international relations (IR) publications aimed at the public, especially Foreign Affairs (more essays, but by world-leading experts, practicioners and officials), Foreign Policy, and IR articles in Political Science Quarterly. The book reviews are especially good - the expert reviewers explain the book and provide context of other points of view, current and historical beliefs in the field, etc.
* Think tanks are prominent in IR and publish a bunch of readable things - better than reading the best journalism, in many cases, in terms of pure knowledge. But you need to be careful - some think tanks are scholarly enterprises, some are partisan hacks. IIRC U of Pennsylvania has a list of top think tanks. In IR, some are Brookings, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), RAND, Chatham House. Be wary of Heritage (basically provides retro-cover and talking points for conservative policy, organizing Trump plans), Cato (libertarianism advocates), American Enterprise Institute (corporate conservatives).
* Search with the terms site:.edu and site:.ac.uk
Hope that helps! Really, I'd find a good textbook or take an online course.
There’s a very big difference between what the USA does in proxy wars vs direct conflicts.
Ukraine doesn’t have air superiority, and is basically getting shipped leftover or soon-to-be disposed equipment. You have some really good points, but I would be cautious about extrapolating over Ukraine.
As a counter-point, you can look at what happened in Iraq when it was basically a large military power entering the Gulf War (and stealth fighter/bombers were in their infancy).
> Ukraine doesn’t have air superiority, and is basically getting shipped leftover or soon-to-be disposed equipment. You have some really good points, but I would be cautious about extrapolating over Ukraine.
The US and Europe is manufacturing artillery shells and other things, and cannot nearly keep up with Ukraine's needs.
That’s true, but the US and Europe also haven’t structured their modern capabilities around artillery. It’s a component of their doctrines, but wasn’t expected to be required in such large quantities as Ukraine has required.
They have astronomical stockpiles of other weapons like JDAMs able to be delivered by F-35, etc.
I think Ukraine is just in a weird situation, because they are fighting WWI-style. NATO has strongly aligned their doctrines with total air superiority, and Ukraine hasn’t been able to take advantage much in that area.
What I said about a lack of capacity is openly said by the US military to be a leading priority.
> They have astronomical stockpiles of other weapons like JDAMs able to be delivered by F-35, etc.
Why do you think that? Last I knew, which was several years ago, it was constrained. I think they ran out in some situations (nothing of much consequence).
There’s a lack of capacity, but it’s a generalization to a very large cold-war style conflict. ie - you are right NATO has identified shortages, but it’s more of a concern for conflicts on world war scales.
Just searching around, the USA alone has 500,000 JDAMs sitting in warehouses. I knew it was a lot because of the recent quotes on what Israel has stockpiled. They are much more effective than artillery, don’t miss, and can be used for deep strikes on stealth aircraft.
My main point here is that Ukraine is a bad example of supply shortages, so I don’t want to lose sight of that. That conflict is a good example of shortages for _part_ of the military supply chain in an unexpected use-case. Full NATO involvement or support would have seen the end of the conflict by now one way or the other. The reason I say that is that Ukraine has put a major dent in Russia’s military with no modern air force, no navy, world war 1 tactics, and at best mediocre support from other countries.
It's well-known that the US and Europe are not structured for artillery warfare. The reason why Europe can't produce enough artillery is because they'd need to massively expand manufacturing to provide for a country that still operates using a land warfare doctrine.
Not that it's an excuse for the EU's poor showing here but it's not at all transferable to the ability of the US and the EU to fight a near-peer. None of the same considerations apply.
I can recommend spending some time in r/credibledefense for more on the topic.
It's not just artillery. It's surprising that seems to be something widely believed. Just off the top of my head, the Navy needs many more cargo ships to supply the Pacific during a war. They need many more anti-air missiles - and much cheaper options, because the missiles are too expensive and, with the advent of drones, too many are needed.
In a near peer conflict, we may not either. That is one part of the scenarios being thought through now. Some of that is already starting to trickle in as changes to things like the Marine Corps restructuring.
"Do such people still rise to leadership in government? Or are they all maximizing click-thru for SV companies?"
Many of the people I know got out of government contract work because the policies and work environment were messed up.
There are only a couple idealistic people that I know of who joined government work after other careers. Technically one of those people was trading in even worse policies/leadership in the military for a defense contraring job as a civilian.
So even the people who are idealistic aren't wanting to stick around, especially if policies and politics are starting to get in the way of the mission.
>> when you'd have to import the steel. We still wouldn't be competitive on cost.
Just because steel is made locally doesn't make it any cheaper. Transport costs are very small these days, thanks to modern shipping. So a local steel producing isn't going to sell below the worldwide market rate, which is defined by the largest steel producers and consumers on a global scale. I remember similar debates years ago about oil, that if the US produced enough domestically that imports could stop and local prices drop. That isn't how the modern world of free trade works.
> that if the US produced enough domestically that imports could stop
Relevant to US shipyards, domestic oil can only supply domestic refineries if there's transport, and there's not enough oil carriers that satisfy the Jones act, because they need to be US built, US flagged, US owned, and US crewed. If the best way to transport the crude is by ocean, it's not going to be extracted and refined in the US; it only makes sense to do both in the US if crude is delivered by pipeline or rail. There's also issues with the grades of oil and how refineries are setup, but that's more tractable if there's supply.
So don't JIT. Just because it's cool doesn't mean it's a good fit in every case. Get a buffer stockpile and refill as needed.
The stuff you'd need to stockpile is unlikely to deprecate in value and it certainly isn't perishables, so doing so really isn't a big deal.
Also once you get an order you already know roughly how much steel you'll need - a bit of lag as you wait for the first batches to arrive really isn't a big deal in such a project.
If you don't assume that the drydock is sitting empty while the construction plans for the next ship are being thought up, why would it sit empty while you wait for supplies?
Presumably you'd get everything lined up before you finish your previous project. Hardly any construction just simply starts the day someone approaches a manufacturer anyways.
Are they 100% domestic military production? Seem like expanding shipyard capacity would require contractors to run it and accept orders for at least other allied navies or maybe commercial vessels too. Otherwise, I don't see it working out sustainably.
Norfolk, Portsmouth, Puget Sound, and Pearl Harbor, are the four entirely domestic military naval shipyards. Newport News, the General Dynamics yard in Groton, and Ingalls Shipbuilding are effectively domestic-military-only shipbuilders.
Some commercial shipbuilders, notably NASSCO, do business with the US Navy for smaller classes of ship as well as auxiliary vessels, and potentially could take orders from foreign militaries.
But yes, there is a massive domestic shipyard and shipbuilding industry in the US that is military-only. There are almost 300 active ships and another 170 in the reserve fleet, almost all with far more complex maintenance requirements than the typical civilian vessel.
Like many government operations, the US government doesn't try to oversee day-to-day operations, and awards those by contract. Same with the operation of national labs, for example.
They are run by contractors because the US government does not have riveting or hull welding in its core competencies.
They are operated by those contractors for a profit, profiting from the US government. The US government does not choose to establish and/or invest in yards, and grant operating contracts to those contractors, for the purpose of making a profit.
The US government does so in order to have a reliable source of naval construction and repair services in case of a military conflict.
