There is a difference between consciousness and free will, though. There may be no such thing as free will and it's all a trick to us, but I mean, there's still a "me" here that experiences things. I can't be sure there's a "you" there, since your consciousness is entirely outside of anything I can perceive, but I can _assume_ it, since it makes sense that we share so much, we'd share that property, too.
It gets really tricky with machines. We share _nothing_ with them, but what about when they start sharing properties with us that we associate with consciousness? I don't have any good answers for that.
But is your "me" an actual entity, or is it just the process of experiencing things? And if the latter, what does it even mean for it to have a persistent identity - and does it, or is there just an illusion of one when you consider a single time slice of processing (e.g. "now").
The problem is that, just as with the outside world, we only have the perception of our own inner workings, not real understanding of them. So we are modelling "I" as an entity, and it seems useful enough for day-to-day purposes, but how accurate is it really if you get to the bottom of it?
Apologies for not catching this in a more-reasonable amount of time, but you're going to have to be more specific about your question. The vast majority of humans throughout history agree that they are "someone", though the full nature of what "someonehood" entails is definitely debatable. I assume you're asking some question about the full nature and definitions and whatever, but you're not really doing it in a way that's answerable. If you can quantify that question better, I can attempt an answer. But this question is the epistemological equivalent of "how fast is a car?"
It gets really tricky with machines. We share _nothing_ with them, but what about when they start sharing properties with us that we associate with consciousness? I don't have any good answers for that.