Quoting from the DC Circuit opinion in "EPIC v. Department of Homeland Security":
"""As other circuits have held, and as the Supreme Court has strongly suggested, screening passengers at an airport is an "administrative search" because the primary goal is not to determine whether any passenger has committed a crime but rather to protect the public from a terrorist attack. See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 958–63 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (passenger search at airport checkpoint); United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 178–81 (3d Cir. 2006) (Alito, J.) (same); United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 499–501 (2d Cir. 1974) (Friendly, J.) (carry-on baggage search at airport); see also Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004) (police set up checkpoint to obtain information about earlier crash); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (sobriety checkpoint). An administrative search does not require individualized suspicion. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41, 47–48 (2000) (individualized suspicion required when police checkpoint is “primarily [for] general crime control,” that is, “to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing” unlike “searches at places like airports ... where the need for such measures to ensure public safety can be particularly acute”). Instead, whether an administrative search is “unreasonable” within the condemnation of the Fourth Amendment “is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)."""
The Edwards reference you mentioned is in there, but so are others. In "United States v. Aukai" (2007) the 9th Circuit said "We have held that airport screening searches, like the one at issue here, are constitutionally reasonable administrative searches because they are "conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, namely, to prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and thereby to prevent hijackings."
In United States v. Hartwell (3d Cir. 2006), para. 8 "We hold that the search was permissible under the administrative search doctrine. Cf. United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir.2005) ("Airport screenings of passengers and their baggage constitute administrative searches and are subject to the limitations of the Fourth Amendment.").
I appreciate your thoroughness. I fear I am not focusing my argument well.
Administrative search at airports is legal, yes.
Consent is not required or relevant, yes.
Bag checks and scans are mandated by law, yes.
Magnetometer searches are protected by law, yes.
Weapons searches are protected by law, yes.
Carrying a meth pipe in your pocket is probably a bad idea, yes.
I am very specifically arguing that modern physical custody searches (aka "pat-downs") as performed by the TSA do not qualify under any Fourth Amendment exemptions. They have not been ruled as constitutionally reasonable upon by the SCOTUS, and that until they are, they are forbidden by the fourth amendment.
Administrative searches must be 'minimally intrusive' and 'escalat[e] in invasiveness only after a lower level of screening disclose[s] a reason to conduct a more probing search'. Custody searches, in my personal opinion, do not qualify as minimally intrusive. Prior to the TSA's inception they were only used in very restricted settings. Now they're considered commonplace.
The view that "They have not been ruled as constitutionally reasonable upon by the SCOTUS, and that until they are, they are forbidden by the fourth amendment." is incorrect.
Were it true then every single new law or administrative action (of the federal government) would need to be reviewed by the Supreme Court before it could be applied. Instead, we have the court system to address these problems after the fact. We assume that laws and policies are constitutional when put into place and use the court system to correct instances where they are not.
For the sake of discussion, let's switch to something similar. The shoe scans are a nuisance and are not effective. People dislike it even worse than the scanners and pat-downs. It takes time, which slows down the number of people who can be processed. Some people have balance or other problems, so it means there needs to be a chair during the line before screening. Others have religious or cultural aversion to putting socks or bare feet on a dirty ground, so many airports provide booties or paper slippers. This makes everything more complex.
The requirement that people must take their shoes off has not "been ruled as constitutionally reasonable upon by the SCOTUS." Therefore, under your viewpoint is it forbidden by the 4th amendment?
The view of the circuit courts, and implied view of the Supreme Court, seems to be that the pat-downs which you mention are reasonable under the 4th amendment, given the "degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests" and that it occurs in a place where "the need for such measures to ensure public safety can be particularly acute."
Yes, that is essentially my view. I do not believe the TSA's current procedures are constitutional. The court system has not corrected this instance of over-reach after ten years, and the TSA's policies continue to become more restrictive, intrusive, and degrading.
I do admit that declaring the TSA's current behavior as 'forbidden' is overzealous and legally inaccurate. I'm just an angry textbox and not a lawyer. :)
I agree with you. However, using false reasoning probably doesn't help. While it may help vent your frustrations, it may also make others thinks that your views are ungrounded in reality.
"""As other circuits have held, and as the Supreme Court has strongly suggested, screening passengers at an airport is an "administrative search" because the primary goal is not to determine whether any passenger has committed a crime but rather to protect the public from a terrorist attack. See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 958–63 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (passenger search at airport checkpoint); United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 178–81 (3d Cir. 2006) (Alito, J.) (same); United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 499–501 (2d Cir. 1974) (Friendly, J.) (carry-on baggage search at airport); see also Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004) (police set up checkpoint to obtain information about earlier crash); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (sobriety checkpoint). An administrative search does not require individualized suspicion. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41, 47–48 (2000) (individualized suspicion required when police checkpoint is “primarily [for] general crime control,” that is, “to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing” unlike “searches at places like airports ... where the need for such measures to ensure public safety can be particularly acute”). Instead, whether an administrative search is “unreasonable” within the condemnation of the Fourth Amendment “is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)."""
The Edwards reference you mentioned is in there, but so are others. In "United States v. Aukai" (2007) the 9th Circuit said "We have held that airport screening searches, like the one at issue here, are constitutionally reasonable administrative searches because they are "conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, namely, to prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and thereby to prevent hijackings."
In United States v. Hartwell (3d Cir. 2006), para. 8 "We hold that the search was permissible under the administrative search doctrine. Cf. United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir.2005) ("Airport screenings of passengers and their baggage constitute administrative searches and are subject to the limitations of the Fourth Amendment.").
These were all easy to find.